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“Patriotism” has, of course, been understood in numerous ways. I want to propose yet another one 
here. It derives from a definition of politics according to which it consists of neither the struggle 
over power nor the management of affairs of state or government; rather, politics is the practice of 
responding to conflict with dialogue. 
What this means, exactly, should become clear as the essay unfolds. It begins by 
distinguishing between the ideas of “patriotism” and “nationalism” in historical, conceptual, and 
geographical terms. Patriotism, it is claimed, constitutes a political philosophy, a very general 
account of the form, or forms, of dialogue that citizens should engage in when responding to their 
conflicts. Nationalism, by contrast, is a political ideology, which is best understood as an account 
of the kinds of things citizens should be saying within those dialogues, in particular, when they 
take the form of negotiation. Then, in contrast to proceduralist and value pluralist political 
philosophies, patriotism is shown to uphold “conversation first, negotiation second, force third” as 
its central political maxim. Finally, the essay concludes with the claim that we should – all of us – 
be affirming a global patriotism, alongside the more local forms.  
 
Patriotism and Nationalism 
The two words, it goes without saying, are often used synonymously. But thinkers as different as 
George Orwell and Hannah Arendt have raised their objections, and they are right to do so.1 Before 
explaining why, however, it’s worth noting that both patriotism and nationalism support the idea 
that people should do more than take merely instrumental stances towards one another. Because 
to do only this is to be capable of sharing strictly “public goods,” as economists call them, such 
things as dams or highways, whereas it is “common goods” that are the bases of genuine 
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communities. And if there is one thing about which both patriots and nationalists can agree, it is 
that there can be no real countries without them. 
But what kind of community is a country? Countries are best understood as civic rather than 
national communities, since they are, above all, communities of citizens. One reason this must be 
so is that many of them contain more than one nation. States often fail to recognize this officially, 
of course, but it is the reality, even if only sociologically speaking. That is why it would have been 
better to have called the most encompassing political organization in the world the “United States” 
rather than “United Nations,” since this would help us to appreciate how it’s possible for many 
nations to share a single state. Alas, the name appears to have been taken. 
Not that we should be satisfied with “United States” either; as we shall see, “Uniting States” 
would have been best. But first we need to look more closely at the distinction between patriotism 
and nationalism. The two differ in at least three ways: historically, conceptually, and 
geographically. 
Regarding history, a “patriot” – to both the American and French revolutionaries, for example 
– is someone who “loves the laws,” in Montesquieu famous phrase. Republican Rome was perhaps 
the chief model here, according to which citizens are friends of a sort, those who fulfill the ideal 
of vivere civile by making the laws that govern how they live their lives. Only this way can they 
ensure that those laws express their common good and so may be followed willingly, even 
spontaneously, rather than because of the police. Indeed, this is the only way a citizenry can be 
considered truly free. That, at least, is the central claim of the civic humanist tradition of political 
thought, one which extends back even further than Rome to the ancient Greek idea of the polis.2 
Nationalism is different. For one thing, it is quintessentially modern, which is why the ancient 
Jewish “nation” in the Bible is today probably best referred to as a “religious community” instead. 
Of course, Jews have also come to constitute a nation in the modern, secular sense as well – one 
which, like all other nations, is lived through largely quotidian practices. These are carried out free 
of hierarchical institutions or structures that, whether conceived in terms of houses of worship or 
a Great Chain of Being, in some sense link them to the transcendent. Perhaps this is why the Jewish 
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community in Israel, which is embraced by most secular and religious Jews today (though not all3), 
is often said to be supported by the political ideology known as “Zionism” rather than “Jewish 
nationalism,” since the latter expression fails to make enough room for the religious. 
Be that as it may, consider what Charles Taylor has had to say about the rise of modern 
nationalism: 
 
The causes of modern nationalism are very deep and have to do with the erosion of 
earlier communities and identifications: the withering away of local community, 
the decline of religious identifications which often by-passed nationality. Indeed, 
the very notion of a group identification founded on a relation to the supernatural 
is strange to many moderns in Atlantic civilization; and the local neighbourhood 
society cannot have the place it once had. But people need a group identification, 
and the obvious one to take the place of the earlier forms is the one that springs to 
the attention of the speaking animal, namely, nationality based on language.4 
 
Had such nations been around during ancient times, thinkers such as Aristotle would probably 
have described their members as sharing not only a form of friendship (philía) but also other kinds 
of love. These include the love between relatives (storgē), given that the members of a nation often 
see themselves as a kind of family, and the love that can lead to producing relatives (érōs), as with 
the passion expressed in so much nationalist poetry. And depending on a given nation’s history, 
we can expect these three to be variously combined in different proportions. Moreover, despite the 
distinction with religious communities, which should be maintained, we may also add religious 
love to the mix, since it would be wrong to assume that national communities are wholly secular.5 
But this raises the difficult question of the sometimes opposing, sometimes synergizing, relations 
between religion and ethics, as when religious love takes the form of what Christians call agápē, 
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since its selflessness and universalism is often very hard to reconcile with ethical particularism. 
Indeed, when Christian writers compare agápē to the other forms of love, they tend to stress not 
only its superiority but also how easily the others can degenerate into self-aggrandizement, or 
worse.6 
Regardless, all of the above suggests that we ought to recognize how, today, the United States, 
France, and Israel are not nations but civic or political communities, states each of which happen 
to contain more than one nation: the anglophone majority American nation alongside the 
Hawaiian, Puerto Rican, other Hispanic and perhaps African American minority nations in the 
United States; the francophone majority French nation alongside the Basque, Breton, Catalan, and 
Corsican micronations in France; and the Jewish majority national and religious community 
alongside the Arab Israeli or (part of the) Palestinian minority nation in Israel. Alas, these realities 
have been obscured by the continuing influence of the Westphalian, “nation-state” model of what 
a country is or should be. It is what has prevented many of us from appreciating how “nations-
state” is usually much more accurate.7 
Still, it was not long after the American and French revolutions that the call of the modern 
national community became very loud indeed. This is why national liberty tends nowadays to 
predominate over political liberty, the liberty of the civic community. As noted, the latter is chiefly 
concerned with the ability of citizens to make the laws that govern how they live their lives. For 
this reason, we should see it as essentially a matter of “self-government.” Of course, self-
government can and should also take place not only at the country-wide state level but also more 
locally: think of the various civic communities identified as regional, provincial, municipal, or 
borough, not to mention the policy-making carried out by the many non-governmental 
organizations found in civil society, from self-governing charities, daycares, schools, and unions, 
to universities, professional associations, and advocacy groups. It is the patriotic sentiments 
sustained when all of these communities, together, succeed at making citizens feel truly at home 
that the political community as a whole can be considered durable. And that is when it is most able 
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to fend off threats from demagogues and other populists, those essentially anti-political actors who 
feed, above all, on citizen alienation. 
The difference between this political liberty and the liberty of the nation should be clear, 
especially given the two unique conditions of the latter. The first, and better known, is “self-
determination,” wherein the nation is assured of having a major degree of control over its destiny 
– be it because its members form a clear majority in a democracy, or because one of them rules in 
a dictatorship (evidently, self-determination is very different from self-government). The second 
is the recognition of the nation by the state, or states, under whose sovereignty it lives. Often, this 
can be met purely symbolically, as with a clause in the state’s constitution, or a symbol on its flag. 
So we can readily understand why Taylor has remarked that “anyone who can use the expression 
‘just symbolic’ has missed something essential about the nature of modern society.”8  
The fact that they are associated with different kinds of liberty is thus one way that patriotism 
and nationalism can be distinguished. To which we may now add that, conceptually, the two are 
also qualitatively different forms of thought, since patriotism is a political philosophy and 
nationalism is a political ideology. A political philosophy is a very general account of the form or 
forms of dialogue that citizens ought to engage in when responding to conflict. The advocates of 
different political philosophies can thus be seen as promoting different forms of dialogue. For 
example, proceduralist political philosophers such as utilitarians or Kantians call on people to 
appeal to a systematic theory of justice for guidance, and this means that they will need to plead 
their cases before whatever authority is charged with applying the theory. Often, that authority is 
identified with their country’s supreme court, which is understood to make its rulings on the basis 
of a constitution that (it is hoped) conforms to the theory. One might nevertheless object that 
pleading is a far too unidirectional means of communication to count as a genuine form of 
dialogue: one meaning of the ancient Greek dia- is “between,” which implies that there must be at 
least two distinct parties, both of whom are prepared to change on the basis of what they hear. A 
theory of justice, however, is something that has been already formulated beforehand, usually by 
a lone philosopher, and the act of putting it into practice is not supposed to alter its principles in 
any fundamental way. This – and the often highly sophisticated forms of reasoning required for 
formulating and applying what are, after all, extremely abstract principles – is why proceduralist 
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approaches are often powerless to alleviate the sense of alienation that they encourage ordinary 
citizens to feel towards both their principles and the experts (judges, lawyers, and bureaucrats) 
charged with applying them. 
This criticism is not one that political philosophers who subscribe to value pluralism must 
face, since they favour negotiation over pleading – and negotiation, at least when carried out in 
good faith, does indeed consist of the kind of give-and-take that allows us to speak of a genuine 
back-and-forth between two or more interlocutors. It is because value pluralists tend to conceive 
of values as incommensurable with each other that they believe the principles expressing them 
cannot be interlocked, and so that there simply cannot be a systematic theory of justice that is true 
to all of them. This is why, instead of turning to such a theory for guidance, they think the best we 
can do is to make trade-offs with each other – to compromise as part of a struggle for balanced 
accommodations. 
Patriotic political philosophy is different, since it would have us respond to political conflict 
with conversation before turning to negotiation or, following it, pleading. While conversing, 
interlocutors exchange (sometimes very critical) interpretations of given practices in order to bring 
about (sometimes very radical) transformations of the values underlying them. They need to do 
this if they are to have a hope of making the values compatible, of reconciling, rather than merely 
accommodating, their conflict. When successful, the values, and so the common good of those 
upholding them, may be said to have been developed and realised – a goal which, evidently, comes 
down to us from the civic humanist tradition. Nowadays, however, patriots tend to have a much 
stronger sense of history than their forebears, which is why contemporary patriotism’s conception 
of reconciliation can be associated with the idea of progress. This is also why it makes sense to 
situate the conversational response to conflict on the left-wing of a reconceived political spectrum. 
But since conversation is an extremely fragile mode of dialogue, we must accept that there will 
often be no choice but to negotiate and so to take on a more centrist attitude towards a given 
conflict. And should those negotiations break down, making pleading or less civilized forms of 
force unavoidable, then it will be necessary to move to the right. It all depends on one’s judgment 
of the circumstances.9 
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Note that patriotic political philosophy has relatively little to say about content – about what 
positions, in particular, citizens should be taking as they converse, negotiate, or plead. True, some 
relatively simple maxims can be derived directly from the very idea of these forms of speech, such 
as that interlocutors must have enough to eat if they’re not be distracted by hunger, or that those 
who are clearly set on undermining the civic community are not worth conversing with, just as 
those who are worthy ought to be listened to with an open mind as well as spoken to in ways 
conducive to reaching an understanding. But none of these maxims are capable of being articulated 
in categorical, much less systematic and so theoretical, ways, since they too depend on the 
circumstances. 
It does, however, make sense to appeal to preconceived doctrines when it comes to 
negotiation. And this is where political ideologies come in. Because whenever one has no choice 
but to balance values against each other, then it can indeed be worthwhile to invoke an ideology, 
be it liberalism, conservatism, socialism, feminism, environmentalism, or some other such doctrine 
– it all depends on one’s understanding of the political culture, that is, of the traditions of one’s 
civic community and the best ways of fulfilling them. Ideologies can help since they tell us how 
values should be ranked and so weighed: crudely put, liberalism prioritizes the liberty of the 
individual; conservatism order through controlled change; socialism equality; and so on. But 
ideologies can also serve as obstacles when we rely upon them prematurely, since conversation 
requires interlocutors that are willing to listen to each other rather than to some doctrine. 
Of course, nationalism is the ideology favoured by those who would rank the needs of the 
national community above all others. And it goes without saying that one of the most significant 
among these is the nation’s liberty. Nationalists nevertheless rightly consider their culture – both 
its preservation and development – to be even more important than national liberation. This is 
because culture is the raison d’être of the nation; there is no point in struggling for freedom if you 
haven’t secured your nation’s heritage first. The modern Greeks (who seem to have forgotten all 
about the polis) have been well aware of this, as the following bit of history makes clear: 
 
Athens – 1821. Greeks are fighting for their independence. In Athens, they besiege 
the Acropolis, a stronghold of the Turkish occupiers. As the siege grinds on, the Turks’ 
ammunition runs short. They begin to dismantle sections of the Parthenon, prying out 
the 2,300-year-old lead clamps and melting them down for bullets. The Greek fighters, 
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horrified at this defacement of their patrimony, send the Turks a supply of bullets. 
Better to arm their foes, they decide, than to let the ancient temple come to harm.10 
 
Only true nationalists would fight in this way. 
If patriotism is indeed a political philosophy and nationalism a political ideology, then it 
should be possible for a patriot to be a nationalist – or not, since one could always be a patriotic 
liberal, conservative, socialist, feminist, green, and so on instead (or even a mixture of two or more 
of these). In fact, some call themselves patriots while at the same time opposing nationalism – 
Hegel, for one, or in our own day Jürgen Habermas, for another.11 Note, however, that their 
patriotisms are different from the one described here, since they assume that the civic or political 
community, and so its common good, can be conceived of as a unity, whereas it is a central 
assumption of this essay that any successful conversation can, at best, bring citizens closer towards 
unity. This is because the reconciliation of values is never more than a matter of further integrating 
them, the assumption being that a perfect, in the sense of complete, reconciliation is impossible. 
For one thing, any resolution of a given conflict is bound to lead to new perspectives, and these 
are bound to produce new conflicts; it has always been thus and there is every reason to believe 
that it will continue to be so. For another, it is, again, necessary to accept that conversations tend 
to fail, and so that we will have no choice but to dirty our hands with the compromises of 
negotiation. At such times talk of unification will be even less appropriate.12 That said, negotiating 
only after genuine attempts at conversation have failed makes a great deal of sense. When value 
pluralists recommend negotiation, they can appeal to no more than the virtue of toleration in the 
hopes of maintaining a spirit of good faith between what they sometimes identify as “moral 
enemies.”13 But when patriots negotiate, they do so, as we’ve seen, with civic friends. And this, 
surely, means that the negotiations will be far more sustainable.14 
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Lastly, turning to the geographical difference between patriotism and nationalism, it is best 
grasped by invoking yet another kind of community: the ethnic. It is because we normally join 
ethnic communities through being born into them that, as Max Weber once pointed out, to share 
an ethnicity is to share a belief in “common descent.”15 This can also be true of religious and 
national communities, but not necessarily, since one can always convert and language and culture 
are things that people can adopt. As for the civic community, it is, of course, often possible to 
obtain new citizenship through immigration. These differences should make it evident that one can 
not only be a member of more than one community, as well as kind of community, at the same 
time, but also that the concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism, so dear to political scientists, 
obscure rather than clarify and so would be best abandoned. 
The geography becomes relevant when we notice another difference between national, civic, 
and ethnic communities, namely, that only the members of the first two can be said to feel a special 
sort of attachment to a fixed and clearly demarcated piece of territory. When those who identify 
with an ethnicity have something like these feelings, they will tend to be directed towards the 
territory of the “mother country,” which will be found outside of the borders of the state where 
they presently live. The Chinese- or Italian-Canadian ethnic communities, for example, while often 
situated in particular neighbourhoods within Canada, are not so in any permanent way. But the 
same cannot be said of, say, the nation of francophone Quebecers, since it is hard to imagine it 
ever changing its geographic home. 
Unlike the nation, the civic community’s territory is, again, less a matter of the land than of 
the jurisdiction of the state, since it is within its borders that its laws, and so citizens’ self-
government, apply. Ever since Montesquieu, however, many have assumed that modern states are 
unlike the polis in being too large to sustain genuine civic communities. The claim has roots in 
Aristotle’s idea that the polis should not be so big that citizens could not know each others’ 
characters.16 But then Aristotle never dreamed of Gutenberg’s invention, nor Montesquieu of the 
telephone, radio, or television, not to mention the Internet. It is thanks to innovations in 
communications technology such as these that we can, today, go so far as to speak of the existence 
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of not only a global civil society but also the beginnings of a global civic community.17 Because 
conversations can and do take place across borders; and sometimes, of course, they are about 
politics. Indeed, they must be if we’re ever properly to respond to many of the challenges faced by 
the world today: regarding the environment, the global economy, and war, to mention just a few. 
These, then, are why we are in need of a global patriotism. 
 
A Global Patriotism 
This is the patriotism of all who conceive of themselves as citizens of the world. It makes sense to 
invoke it even though there exists at present no global state to express it institutionally. Nor should 
the fact that people also feel loyalty to other, local communities put the existence of this global 
one in question. Because after all, we can and should love different people, and in different ways. 
Just as local patriotism ought to be distinguished from nationalism, global patriotism should 
not be confused with cosmopolitanism. For one thing, the latter is not a philosophy but another 
political ideology. Cosmopolitans are those who, should they find themselves negotiating conflicts 
between the global and the local, favour the former, whereas nationalists, again, favour the latter. 
And since patriots favour conversation, they will, to repeat the point, negotiate only after the 
conversation has broken down. So it is at such times that we may witness an encounter between, 
say, a patriotic cosmopolitan and a patriotic nationalist – each of whom, we can hope, will 
recognize the legitimacy, at least, of the other. Not that patriotic cosmopolitans are typical, since 
cosmopolitans have long tended to arrive at their ideology (if they would even agree to call it an 
ideology) on the basis of an abstract universalism, one that, today, tends to take the form of a 
theory of human rights. And those who find universal theories attractive tend to have little place 
for the idea of a global civic or political community towards which one might feel patriotic; 
instead, their chief loyalty is usually to a set of abstract principles, one that they hope will be 
applied by institutions such as the International Court of Justice. True, cosmopolitans will 
occasionally be heard invoking the idea of a “global community,” but one has to wonder at the 
notion of a community that consists of rights-bearing human beings, that is, of the members of a 
certain biological species. Must not real communities consist of persons instead, which is to say 
of people with historically situated identities? Indeed, as Kierkegaard once complained, the love 
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of abstract humanity is a decadent, because fantastic, form of love, since “at a distance one’s 
neighbour is only a figment of the imagination.”18 
War was mentioned as one of reasons we’re in need of a global patriotism. It goes without 
saying that war has served as one of the two basic means whereby people have attempted to bring 
international conflicts to an close, the other being diplomacy, that is, negotiation (sometimes in 
good faith, sometimes not). If we put conversation first, however, we insert an extra step into the 
conflict resolution process – one that, if successful, would make the others unnecessary. Not that, 
to repeat the point, there is any guarantee that these conversations will succeed. Still, we can be 
sure that, if we never try, real peace-making opportunities will be missed.19 
Or consider the 2008 global financial crisis. If there’s one thing that it should have made clear 
to all, it is that there is a pressing need for states to reform their macroeconomic policies. Because 
ad hoc policy co-ordination, driven as it mainly has been by instrumental considerations, remains 
inadequate. True, the leading economic powers were able to inject liquidity into turbulent markets, 
as well as to recapitalize or reorganize many troubled financial institutions. But all this took place 
behind a veil of ignorance, so to speak. For citizens − not least those in the United States – were, 
and continue to be, largely ignorant of the degree to which funds raised through their taxes served, 
and continue to serve, as the investor of last resort for foreign institutions such as other countries’ 
major banks. American politicians, in particular, have simply failed to inform their constituents of 
the reality of this global fiscal federalism, and they have done so out of an (understandable) fear 
of the backlash that would arise once taxpayers realised that they have been supporting much more 
than their local state. Only the highly technical nature of the global financial apparatus has allowed 
this state of affairs to remain hidden. Sooner or later, however, the truth is bound to get out.20 
As it should. For the hypocrisy underlying this “noble lie,” as some see it, is simply not 
sustainable. Only by giving the world’s civic or political community its due can we properly 
support inter-state fiscal cooperation and in this way complement, rather than compete with, the 
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Market Studies 47, no. 5 (Nov. 2009): 955–75. Adam McKay’s popular film, The Big Short (2015), has helped lift the 
veil as regards American support for American banks and investment firms, but not those outside the country. 
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more local patriotisms. True, many of the relevant differences are bound to be irreconcilable. But 
we will never know which ones are, and which are not, if we never even try to reconcile them. 
 
Naïveté? 
This modern patriotism, with its conversations about the common good, certainly sounds nice. But 
is it realistic? Are people truly capable of the degree of generosity of spirit that it appears to 
require? And even if they are, would not the vast disparities of power between them undermine 
any such conversation? Perhaps not if this were a perfect world, but then such a world would 
already be just and so would have no need of patriotic or any other kind of political philosophy. 
Indeed, such a world would have no need of politics.  
Thankfully, that is not the world we live in. In any case, conversation does not require 
generosity – on the contrary. Because it is good-faith negotiators who must be willing to make 
concessions and so compromise the values they hold dear; the whole point of conversation, recall, 
is reconciliation, and when a reconciliation is reached it will be “win-win” for all concerned. 
Conversation is in everyone’s interests: the rich and the powerful as well as the poor and the weak. 
The only exception to this involves those who see their interests in terms of glory, especially the 
Homeric kind that comes from defeating an adversary rather than reconciling with a friend or 
compatriot. In fact, patriotism should be understood as asserting the centrality of a form of honour 
that is distinct from glory – distinct not only because of its irenic attitude but also because it rejects 
the idea that honour, too, is necessarily zero-sum and hierarchical. That notion is relevant only to 
premodern conceptions of honour, which we should today recognize as degraded forms of it. For 
what is it to converse with a compatriot over a political disagreement if not to honour them in some 
sense? We could pose the same question as regards the laws and institutions that manage to express 
the citizenry’s common good. This is why patriotic politics can be seen as a way of counteracting 
the status-anxiety experienced by many of our fellow citizens – those who, for example, suffer 
from unemployment, or feel culturally sidelined because they have, say, been repeatedly derided 
by satirical news shows.21 Greg Littman has made the obvious but important observation that 
“mocking someone is a particularly bad tool for making a point to them. People who are mocked 
                                               
21 On how status-anxiety is behind the Brexit referendum result in Britain as well as the election of Donald Trump 
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feel disrespected and people tend not to listen to those they think are disrespecting them.”22 Real 
patriots know this, and they do because, despite the claims of all those from Cervantes to the 
sociologist Peter Berger, they know that honour in the modern world is anything but obsolete.23 
As for the worry that interlocutors unequal in power cannot converse, the very idea of 
conversation assumes that those involved have no wish to put pressure on their opponents, or to 
manipulate them in any way. Otherwise, how could they possibly learn to bring about the 
transformations that reconciliation requires? Of course, it’s often the case that the rich and 
powerful are unwilling or unable to converse, but this can also be true of the weak and poor, 
especially when they have suffered oppression. For the traumas of victimhood, not to mention the 
temptations of revenge, can make it extremely difficult to listen with an open mind.  
One may wonder, however, how it is possible that there has already been so much progress 
given that there has yet to be much in the way of conversational responses to political conflict – 
think of the delegitimization of the institution of slavery, of the rise of gender equality and civil 
rights for minorities as well as a welfare state that has helped meet the needs of the poor. Yet could 
it be that these accomplishments would have been realized even more quickly had those calling 
for them done so less aggressively? There will, of course, always be some on the other side who 
will never listen and so who will have to be forced, one way or another, to go along. But there’s a 
reason why we say that those who live by the sword die by the sword – and if there is one thing 
we know a priori about the difference between the strong and the weak, it is that the former are 
more powerful than the latter: who, then, should we expect to win the vast majority of the struggles 
between them? Would not the attempt to convince, rather than vanquish, thus serve as a more 
effective strategy, at least at first? After all, conversations between unequals take place every day, 
which suggests that there must be many times when the problem is strictly one of people’s 
unwillingness to converse. And aside, again, from the followers of Homer, this can only be because 
they are ignorant about conversation – about what it requires as well as what it can bring. 
                                               
22 Littman, “Seriously Funny: Mockery as a Political Weapon,” in Jason Hold, ed., The Ultimate Daily Show and 
Philosophy: More Moments of Zen, More Indecision Theory (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), p. 59. 
23 On the supposed obsolescence of honour, see Cervantes, The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha, 
trans. John Rutherford (London: Penguin Books, 2000 [1605, 1615]); as well as Peter Berger, “On the Obsolescence 
of the Concept of Honor,” in Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., Revisions: Changing Perspectives in 
Moral Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1983). I explore the alternative, patriotic 
conception of honour in my novel, The Adventurous Young Philosopher Theo Hoshen of Toronto (Montreal: Angst 
Patrol, 2013). 
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Philosophers deserve much of the blame for this. Many of us are not as far from Homer as we 
believe; one has only to think of our discipline’s all-too macho reputation. From Socrates’ crushing 
of his interlocutors in Plato’s so-called dialogues; to Boethius’ inability to get an attentive ear from 
Philosophy, his “nurse” who repeatedly employs martial metaphors; to the willingness of Hegel’s 
masters to fight to the death for recognition from their slaves; to John Stuart Mill’s famous 
declaration that truth comes best from “the rough process of a struggle between combatants 
fighting under hostile banners”; to Foucault’s fearless, because dangerous, speech; to Habermas’ 
well-known praise of the force (even if somehow unforced) of the better argument – few 
philosophers seem aware of conversation’s extreme fragility.24 No wonder Plato has been called 
“the war lover,” and Derrida has rallied his fellow deconstructionists to engage in a “violence 
against violence.”25 Perhaps, then, Musil was right (at least as regards theorists): “Philosophers are 
violent and aggressive persons who, having no army at their disposal, bring the world into 
subjection to themselves by means of locking it up in a system.”26 And perhaps that is why so 
many of us have made the mistake of thinking that conversation requires (impossibly) equal 
interlocutors, when what is really needed is no more than that form of “symmetry” present 
whenever people concerned about their common good are willing to speak and listen in turn.27 
As for the many non-philosophers who have acquiesced to this combativeness, perhaps it is 
because they have not been encouraged to appreciate how the reconciliation of conflict is at the 
heart of our obligations as citizens. When schools bother to provide a civic education, conflict 
resolution is rarely if ever the focus; as a result, little is done to undermine the powerful influence 
that the warrior ethic has had on our political cultures. Instead, the highest praise continues to go 
                                               
24 See Plato: The Collected Dialogues Including the Letters, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans. 
Benjamin Jowett et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. 
and trans. P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [c. 524]); Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. J.N. 
Findlay, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 [1807]), pp. 111–18; Mill, On Liberty (1859), in 
On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 49; Foucault, 
Discourse & Truth and Parrēsia, eds. Henri-Paul Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2019); and Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 306.   
25 Leon Harold Craig, The War Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); 
and Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 117.  
26 Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities, vol. 1, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (London: Picador, 1979 
[1930]), p. 300. 
27 On this symmetry, see Martin Buber, “Dialogue,” in Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1947). 
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to those who are willing to fight for justice, for rights, for “the little guy,” etc., rather than, say, to 
those who have the humility to admit when they are wrong. At best, we are taught that toleration 
is the greatest political virtue, since it brings a willingness to compromise. But compromise, again, 
is essential to negotiation, not conversation. And conversation is better. 
Two more patriotic suggestions to conclude. The first consists of a call for reforming political 
institutions so that they facilitate – or at least stop interfering with – conversation. Think, for 
example, of the symbolic value that could come from changing the architecture of the debating 
chambers in parliamentary democracies: instead of the traditional rectangular room in which 
government and opposition sit “two sword-lengths apart,” implying that they are engaged in a 
zero-sum “clash” or “collision,” parliamentarians could sit in a circular or semi-circular pattern, 
which suggests not only that they share a common good, even if only in principle, but also that 
subtly different rather than polar opposite positions on issues are to be expected, indeed welcomed. 
Perhaps the room could even be redesignated as a “conversing” rather than “debating” chamber − 
not out of the hope that only conversations would take place there, of course, but simply because 
it would make clear what should be the ideal, and thereby help make this form of dialogue a little 
more likely.28 
Second, citizens who wish to become directly involved in politics should favour membership 
in political parties over interest groups and other such non-governmental organisations. Because 
parties – or at least those that are serious about attaining power – can only do so if they develop 
platforms that give a place to all of the relevant values. Instead of approaching issues narrowly, 
through the prism of a single concern, or set of concerns, they can and should engage in holistic 
thinking, the kind that relates each political position to many if not all of the others. In this way, 
they help to keep the common good the central concern, both within and without the party. And 
they can do this even though parties in democratic systems necessarily compete with each other 
for power when it comes to elections. While doing so makes them into “adversaries,” they are still 
parts of a larger whole within which, ideally, they will be no more than “opponents.”29 After all, 
there must be some reason why the official opposition in Westminster systems is known as 
“His/Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.” 
                                               
28 See my Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2003), pp. 131–34. 
29 See my “Opponents vs. Adversaries in Plato’s Phaedo,” in Patriotic Elaborations. 
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Do these two suggestions undermine the claim, made above, that patriotic political philosophy 
is relatively silent about content, about the kinds of things that citizens ought to be saying when 
they converse about politics? On the contrary, they are meant to do no more than trace some of the 
lines over which people can be expected to diverge, sometimes radically. Yet when they cross 
those lines – those frontiers – they will do so, at least on occasion, not only because they disagree 
but also because they believe that this is the best way of reaching agreement. Put differently, we 
may say that theirs is a global, and not merely local, patriotism. 
